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UNSTABLE FOOTING: SHELBY COUNTYS MISAPPLICATION
OF THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
Austin Graham*
The general government will, at all times, stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments;and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government.
 Alexander Hamilton1
The Constitution assigns states the power to regulate The Times, Places and
Manner of federal elections but permits Congress discretion to override state determi-
nations on the subject.2 States have wider autonomy in establishingtheir internal
votinglaws and qualifications.3Generally, the Tenth Amendment4 is regarded as the
constitutional root of this authority.5
The VotingRights Act of 19656(VRA)fundamentally altered the traditional al-
location of electoral control between the federal government and the states. Under the
Act, certain states and political subdivisions were required to submit all proposed elec-
toral legislation to federal officials for approval before such laws could take effect.7
* J.D. Candidate 2015, William and Mary Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Rebecca Green for her assistance in completingthis Note.
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 228(Alexander Hamilton)(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1864).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1.
3 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (No function is more essential to
the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power
to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for
state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for fillinglocal
public offices.); Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) (Each State has the power
to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen,
and the title to offices shall be tried, whether in the judicial courts or otherwise.).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X (The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.).
5 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 12425 ([T]he Framers of the Constitution intended the States
to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.
(footnote omitted)). The Guarantee Clause also is considered a source of state power and a
handicap on the federal governments ability to control state elections. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§4;see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2223 (1988).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 19731973bb-1 (2006).
7 See infra Part I.B.
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At the time of the Acts passage and for many years after, this departure from the tra-
dition of state control was justifiable as a remedy for the systematic scourge of racial
discrimination in voting.8
In Shelby County v. Holder,9 the Supreme Court dismantled the VRAs most strin-
gent regime by invalidatingthe coverage formula employed to bringjurisdictions
under federal oversight.10While Shelby County restored a more balanced allotment of
electoral control, the decision recurrently referenced the principle of equal sover-
eignty of states as a restraint on the federal governments ability to disparately regu-
late states.11But this concept of equal state sovereignty does not have the constitutional
foundation implied by Shelby County.12There does exist an equal footingdoctrine that
superficially bears some semblance to a principle of equal sovereignty.13The equal
footingdoctrine generally prohibits Congress from abridgingthe sovereignty of new
states through conditions in acts admittingthem to the Union.14Outside the context
of state admissions, however, the equal footing doctrine has never limited Congresss
ability to impose discrepant obligations on states through legislation.15
Shelby County was a patent misapplication of the equal footingdoctrine. This Note
proffers a three-factor explanation for the Courts decision to utilize the doctrine as
justification for invalidating the Voting Rights Acts coverage formula. First, precedent
had cabined the Courts capacity to annul the coverage formula with more established
constitutional principles, so the Court had to reach for precedential support peripheral
to the context of voting rights litigation. Second, the equal footing doctrines varied
historical applicability engendered flexibility in the doctrine that allowed for its use in
the domain of votingrights litigation. Third, the Court did not actuallyemploy the equal
footingdoctrine in Shelby County, and instead cited the doctrines precedent as consti-
tutional beddingfor a discrete concept of state dignity as sovereigns.
This Note commences with an overview of the Voting Rights Acts structure and
Court decisions interpreting it. Section II summarizes the equal footing doctrines
meaning and historical application. Section III posits an explanation for the Courts
decision to employ the equal footingdoctrine in Shelby County. The object of this Note
8 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (Congress considered
determination that at least another 7years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter
the perpetuation of 95years of pervasive votingdiscrimination is both unsurprisingand
unassailable.); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (The Voting
Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting,
which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.).
9 133S. Ct. 2612(2013).
10 Id. at 2631.
11 See infra note 137.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See infra Part II.B.
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 See infra Part II.B.
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is not to assess the rectitude of Shelby Countys invalidation of the Voting Rights Act
coverage formula. Rather, the aim is to illustrate Shelby Countys flagrant misapplica-
tion of the equal footingdoctrine.
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A. Background to the Enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
A century after the Civil Wars culmination, racial discrimination continued to
endure in the United States, particularly in the South.16The realm of elections was
especially rife with inequity. Discriminatory votinglaws were pervasive as Southern
states unremittingly flouted the mandates of the Fifteenth Amendment through mea-
sures designed to inhibit African American participation in the electoral process.17
Discriminatory votingdevices, frequently in the mode of literacy tests and poll
taxes, were a particularly effective method of denyingminority suffrage.18 Initially,
Congress tried to fight racial discrimination in votingon a case-by-case basis and
through expansion of the statutory mechanisms available to challenge votinglaws.19
These attempts by Congress20 and federal courts21 foundered, though, as Southern
states interminably circumvented federal commands.22
16 Beginningin the late 1870s, many states codified Jim Crow laws sanctioningracial
segregation in virtually all societal contexts. David Pilgrim, What was Jim Crow?, FERRIS
STATE UNIV. (Sept. 2000), http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm.
17 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 31011 (1966).
18 Id. at 31112. Some officials encouraged outright violence to stymie African American
participation in elections. On the eve of Wilmington, North Carolinas mayoral election in
1898, a candidate urged white voters to [G]o to the polls tomorrow and if you find the negro
out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if he refuses[,]kill him;shoot him down in his
tracks. Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act:
Getting the Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 227(2012)
(quotingSTEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE:AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 18821930 67 (1995)).
19 The Civil Rights Act of 1957established the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, which was authorized to challenge the constitutionality of barriers to minority
electoral participation. Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5of the
Voting Rights Act: The Need for A Revised Bailout System, 30ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9,
13(2010);see also Sudeep Paul, The Voting Rights Acts Fight to Stay Rational:Shelby
County v. Holder, 8DUKE J. CONST. L.&PUB. POLY SIDEBAR 271, 271(2013)(notingTitle
I of Civil Rights Act of 1964expedited votingcases to three-judge federal panels).
20 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78Stat. 241(codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §2000a (2006));Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74Stat. 86(codified as
amended at 42U.S.C. §1971(2006));Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71Stat. 634
(codified as amended at 42U.S.C. §1971(2006)).
21 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364U.S. 339(1960);Terry v. Adams, 345U.S. 461
(1953);Guinn v. United States, 238U.S. 347(1915).
22 See Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 314(1966).
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By 1965, Congress was exasperated with the Souths sustained exclusion of
African Americans from the electoral process.23 In January and February of 1965,
Martin Luther King, Jr. organized marches designed to highlight the systematic de-
nial of African Americans voting rights in Alabama.24On March 7, 1965, state police
seekingto dissolve a protest assaulted demonstrators with tear gas and clubs.25Fifty
demonstrators were hospitalized, and the assault, dubbed Bloody Sunday, brought
national attention to the scourge of racial discrimination in the Deep South.26Bloody
Sunday decisively showcased the need for robust federal legislation to protect minority
votingrights in the South, and Congress responded with the VotingRights Act of
1965, a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrim-
ination ha[d] been most flagrant.27 Usingits Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority,28 Congress intended the VRA to finally bring to fruition the Constitutions
command that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged because of race.29
B. Structure of the Voting Rights Act
The VRAs provisions are divisible into two categories: (1) permanent measures
applicable across the nation, and (2)temporary remedial measures targeted against
jurisdictions with the most flagrant histories of votingdiscrimination.30On a national
scale, Section 2 prohibits any voting practice that results in a denial or abridgment
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.31
Sections 3, 6(a), and 13(b)provide procedural mechanisms for challengingvoting
laws.32Sections 11and 12impose civil and criminal sanctions for interference with
rights protected by the Act.33Section 10, in essence, invalidates the use of poll taxes
throughout the country.34
23 See id. at 315.
24 Jessie Kindig, Bloody Sunday, Selma, Alabama (March 7, 1965), BLACKPAST, http://
www.blackpast.org/aah/bloody-sunday-selma-alabama-march-7-1965(last visited Oct. 23,
2014).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 315.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.).
30 Burns, supra note 18, at 23132.
31 VotingRights Act of 1965§2(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973a (2006)).
32 Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 316.
33 Id.
34 VotingRights Act of 1965§10(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973(h)(2006)).
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The temporary measures are more formidable. Perhaps the Acts strongest
provision is Section 5.35Under the Section 5framework, a covered jurisdiction must
submit any proposed alteration to its votinglaws to the Justice Department or to the
D.C. District Court for preclearance before such change can take effect.36The juris-
diction has the burden of demonstratingthat its proposed change will not have a retro-
gressive effect on minority votingstrength.37 The Justice Department or the D.C.
District Court will deny preclearance if the proposed change has the purpose or effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.38 A voting
change abridges the right to vote if it diminishes a minority groups ability to elect
[its] preferred candidates of choice.39
The procedure for determiningwhich states and jurisdictions were covered by
preclearance was diagrammed in Section 4(b), a provision known as the coverage
formula.40Under the original coverage formula, any state or jurisdiction that incor-
porated votingtests or devices41 as of November 1, 1964, and had less than fifty
percent of its votingage population registered to vote as of November 1, 1964, or
experienced voter turnout of less than fifty percent in the 1964presidential election,
was subject to Section 5preclearance.42 Congress deliberately reverse-engineered
the coverage formula, such that it pinpointed jurisdictions where it believed voting
discrimination was most pervasive, and then concocted a formula to bringsuch juris-
dictions into preclearance coverage.43
Upon takingeffect, the coverage formula ensnared a sizeable portion of the South:
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and twenty-six
counties in North Carolina all immediately fell into coverage.44Alaska, three Arizona
counties, and single counties in Hawaii and Idaho, respectively, also were determined
to satisfy the formulas criteria by the end of 1965.45Subsequent amendments to the
VRA brought additional states and jurisdictions into coverage.46By 2013, nine states
35 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 31516.
36 VotingRights Act of 1965§5(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973c (2006)).
37 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ([T]he purpose of § 5 has always
been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retro-
gression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.).
38 42U.S.C. §1973c(a)(2006).
39 Id. §1973c(b).
40 See Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 317.
41 Tests or devices triggeringstatutory coverage included literacy tests, grandfather
clauses, propertyqualifications, and good-morals requirements. Burns, supra note 18, at 233.
42 Id.
43 See Paul, supra note 19, at 27778.
44 Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 318.
45 Id.
46 See William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder:The
Restoration of Constitutional Order, 20122013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 3738 (2013).
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in their entirety were subject to preclearance:Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi,South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.47Additionally, California,
Florida, Michigan, NewYork, NewHampshire, North Carolina, and South Dakota all
contained political subdivisions subject to preclearance.48
States or jurisdictions that do not meet the coverage formulas criteria still can fall
into the preclearance regime through Section 3s bail-in procedure.49 Accordingly,
a jurisdiction is bailed into preclearance if a federal district court finds that the juris-
diction is intentionally denying citizens constitutional voting rights.50Implementa-
tion of the bail-in provision is infrequent, though, as courts require a showingof
intentional discrimination before coverage can attach.51
Conversely, covered states and jurisdictions can escape their preclearance obliga-
tions through Section 4(a)s bailout provision.52Under Section 4(a), a covered juris-
diction can obtain a declaratoryjudgment from the D.C. District Court releasingit from
preclearance if the jurisdiction demonstrates compliance with the VRAs mandates,
and otherwise has maintained a clean record with respect to votingrights duringthe
precedingten years.53Although bailout provides a seemingly attractive escape mech-
anism from preclearance, in practice, only a fraction of covered jurisdictions have
47 Burns, supra note 18, at 236.
48 Id.
49 VotingRights Act of 1965§3(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973a(c)(2006));see also Paul,
supra note 19, at 274.
50 See Paul, supra note 19, at 274.
51 See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Acts Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119YALE L.J. 1992, 2009(2010).
52 VotingRights Act of 1965§4(a)(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973b(a)(1)(2006)).
53 Id. Christopher B. Seaman summarizes the bailouts statutory requirements in An
Uncertain Future for Section 5of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for A Revised Bailout
System. See Seaman, supra note 19, at 2526. To achieve bailout, a jurisdiction must demon-
strate that duringthe ten years prior to seekingthe declaratory judgment:
(1) it has not used a discriminatory test or device with the purpose or
effect of denyingor abridgingthe right to vote;
(2)no final court judgments, consent decrees, or settlements have been
entered against it for discriminatory votingpractices;
(3)no federal examiners have been sent to the jurisdiction;
(4)the jurisdiction, and all governmental units within its territory, have
complied with Section 5, includingthe submission of all election changes
for preclearance and the repeal of all changes to which objections were
issued;and
(5)no objection has been entered by the Department of Justice or the
U.S. District Court to any change submitted by the jurisdiction and any
governmental unit within its territory.
In addition, the jurisdiction was required to demonstrate it had taken
affirmative steps to expand minorityparticipation in the electoral process.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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achieved bailout.54In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One, Chief
Justice Roberts attributes the bailout provisions underutilization to perceptions that
its statutory requisites are inordinately burdensome.55
C. Amendments to the VRA
Upon passingthe VRA in 1965, Congress initially intended for the temporary
provisions, includingSections 5and 4(b), to expire in five years.56 But Congress
subsequently has amended the Act four times since 1965, simultaneously extending
the temporary provisions duration and widening the VRAs scope.57The VRA was
first amended in 1970, the year in which the Acts temporary provisions were sched-
uled to expire.58The VotingRights Act Amendments of 1970prolonged the tempo-
rary provisions applicability for five more years.59 The 1970 amendments also
tweaked the coverage formula, and preclearance expanded to any jurisdiction that
employed a votingtest or device as of November 1, 1968, and had voter registration
or turnout for the 1968presidential election belowfifty percent of its votingage popu-
lation.60The amended coverage formula captured jurisdictions in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wyoming.61
The temporary provisions again were extended in 1975, this time for seven
years.62The VotingRights Act Amendments of 1975further broadened the coverage
formula such that preclearance applied to any jurisdiction that maintained a voting
test or device as of November 1, 1972, and had voter registration or turnout below
fifty percent for the 1972presidential election.63 As a result, the states of Alaska,
Arizona, and Texas all became subject to statewide preclearance, as did political
subdivisions in California, Florida, Michigan, NewYork, North Carolina, and South
Dakota.64The 1975amendments additionally expanded the VRAs protection to lan-
guage minorities.65The definition of votingtest or device now encompassed the fur-
nishingof English-only votingmaterials in jurisdictions with substantial non-English
54 Id. at 11;see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 211
(2009)(observingthat only 17of 12,000-plus covered jurisdictions had successfully bailed
out of coverage).
55 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 199 (As enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were
temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years.).
56 Paul, supra note 19, at 276n.44.
57 Burns, supra note 18, at 228n.9.
58 Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 37.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 3738.
62 Id. at 38.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 42U.S.C. §1973b(f)(2)(2006);see Burns, supra note 18, at 234.
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speakingminoritypopulations.66The 1975amendments stand as the last time Congress
substantively altered the coverage formula.67
The VRAs temporary provisions, in accordance with the 1975amendments, were
set to expire in 1982.68 In the lead up to the provisions scheduled expiration, Congress
debated whether preclearance was still necessary in light of the considerable ad-
vances in minority electoral participation precipitated by the VRA.69In decidingto
reauthorize the provisions, Congress took note of a tactical shift evident in covered
jurisdictions.70 Largely because of the VRAs mandates, jurisdictions had moved
away from so-called first-generation barriers to minority electoral participation,71
which were the impetus for the VRAs original enactment.72Congress found juris-
dictions instead were utilizingmore nuanced second-generation barriers, such as at-
large votingschemes and dilutive redistrictingplans, to minimize the political heft
of minorityvoters.73The prevalence of second-generation barriers convinced Congress
that preclearance remained a necessary mechanism to protect minority voters.74Thus,
Congress extended preclearance and its coverage formula for twenty-five years.75
The VRAs most recent reauthorization occurred in 2006.76Prior to passingthe
2006amendments, Congress engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the VRA that gen-
erated over 12,000pages of evidence and witness testimony.77All parties agreed the
Act had proven highly effective in eliminatingfirst-generation barriers to minority
voting.78Minorities had realized enormous progress in political participation, as evi-
denced by registration rates, election turnouts, and political representation within cov-
ered jurisdictions.79 Minorities increased electoral participation spawned debate as to
whether Congress finally should permit the VRAs temporary provisions to expire.80
66 Burns, supra note 18, at 234.
67 Id.
68 See Seaman, supra note 19, at 21.
69 Id. at 23.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Paul, supra note 19, at 279.
73 Seaman, supra note 19, at 23.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 24.
76 Burns, supra note 18, at 232.
77 Seaman, supra note 19, at 3637.
78 See Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009) (The historic
accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable.).
79 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, H.R. REP. NO. 109-478§2(b)(1)(2006)
(certifyingVRA had precipitated monumental increases in numbers of registered minority
voters, rate of minority voter turnout, and minority political representation). Duringthe 2004
presidential election, African Americans actually had higher voter registration and turnout
rates than white voters in some covered states. Nw. Austin, 557U.S. at 201.
80 Seaman, supra note 19, at 3435.
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But the persistence of second-generation barriers81troubled Congress.82Reautho-
rizations proponents felt federal oversight was still warranted as a variety of factors
evinced.83 Renewals supporters stressed that preclearance deterred covered juris-
dictions from otherwise instigatingdiscriminatory votinglaws.84 These supporters
thereby won the day, and both the Senate and House overwhelmingly voted in favor
of reauthorization.85 The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
VotingRights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006prolonged appli-
cation of the VRAs temporary provisions for another twenty-five years, locking in
preclearance until 2031.86
The 2006amendments produced two notable substantive changes to Section 5,
which were formulated in response to a pair of Supreme Court decisions limiting
preclearances application.87 First, Congress amended Section 5s language such that
a voting change with the purpose or effect of diminishing a minority groups ability
to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote.88
Second, Congress added a provision explicating that the meaning of purpose
within Section 5 included any discriminatory purpose.89
Although Congress bolstered preclearances statutory reach in 2006, the cover-
age formula remained static.90 Whether a jurisdiction was subject to preclearance
still hinged on election data from 1964, 1968, and 1972.91 A group of Republican
81 Second-generation barriers dilute a minority groups voting power so as to inhibit their
ability to elect favored candidates. Common second-generation barriers include at-large voting
schemes, annexations, and multi-member districts. H.R. REP.NO. 109-478§2(b)(4)(A)(2006).
82 Id. §2.
83 See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 39. These factors included racially
polarized voting in covered jurisdictions, the Justice Departments continued issuance of
Section 5preclearance objections, the numerous filings of Section 2litigation in covered
jurisdictions, and the filingof enforcement actions to protect language minorities. H.R. REP.
NO. 109-478, at 23.
84 Seaman, supra note 19, at 3334.
85 The Senate unanimously passed reauthorization, while the House of Representatives
voted in favor of reauthorization by a vote of 390to 33. Burns, supra note 18, at 232n.33.
86 See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 38.
87 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539U.S. 461, 463(2003)(holdingthat an assessment of
whether a redistrictingplan results in retrogression of minority groups effective exercise of
electoral franchise depends on all relevant circumstances, and not only on comparative ability
of minority group to elect its candidate of choice);Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528U.S.
320, 341 (2000) ([W]e hold that § 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan
enacted with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose.).
88 42U.S.C. §1973c(b)(2006).
89 Id. §1973c(c).
90 See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 39.
91 Id. Professor Richard Hasen, a prominent election lawscholar, was an unexpected ad-
vocate for readjustingthe coverage formula. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 217(2006)(statement of Prof. Richard Hasen)
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congressmen did propose an update to the coverage formula that would have incorpo-
rated election data from the 1996, 2000, and 2004presidential elections in lieu of the
older data.92In the proposed formula, a jurisdiction would fall into coverage if it em-
ployed a discriminatory votingtest or had voter turnout below fifty percent in any of
the last three presidential elections.93The proposed formula, though, was not included
in the final amendments, due to concerns about its constitutionality.94
D. Supreme Court Interpretation of Section 5Through Northwest Austin
For nearly fifty years, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the VRAs tempo-
rary provisions, justifyingits holdings on both congressional evidence and judicial
deference.95The Court traditionally evaluated challenges to the preclearance regime
under a lenient rational basis standard of review, maintaining that Congress may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation in voting.96
South Carolina v. Katzenbach97is the granddaddy of all preclearance litigation.
Immediately after the VRA became effective, South Carolina challenged the consti-
tutionality of assorted VRA provisions as overextensions of Congresss power and
encroachments onto state sovereignty.98The Court principally regarded the challenge
as an issue of whether Congress properly acted within its constitutional authority in
enactingthe VRA.99In resolvingthis question, Katzenbach laid down the standard
of review that would safeguard the VRA for nearly a half century: As against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.100The Court expounded
that the mandates of the Fifteenth Amendment supersede[] any contrary exertions of
state power101and Congress, charged with enforcingthe Fifteenth Amendment, has
full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation in voting.102To support its reasoning, the Court conjured Chief Justice John
(Congress should update the coverage formula based on data indicating where intentional
state discrimination in votingon the basis of race is now a problem or likely to be one in the
near future.).
92 See Seaman, supra note 19, at 3839.
93 Id. at 39.
94 Id. Constitutional concerns about the proposed coverage formula centered on its pro-
jected coverage of jurisdictions without notable histories of votingdiscrimination. Hawaii,
for instance, was the only state qualifyingfor statewide coverage. Id.
95 Paul, supra note 19, at 27677.
96 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 324(1966).
97 Id. at 301.
98 Id. at 323.
99 Id. at 324.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 325.
102 Id. at 326.
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Marshalls eminent language fromMcCulloch v. Maryland: Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.103
After establishingits standard of review, the Court assessed the constitutionality
of Section 4(b)s coverage formula. The Court was satisfied Congress had sufficient
evidence to conclude that jurisdictions covered by the formula had engaged in system-
atic discrimination.104The Court recognized that Congress purposefully devised a for-
mula to pull particular jurisdictions into preclearance by pinpointingthe two invidious
characteristics they all shared:utilization of discriminatory votingtests and devices,
and a votingrate in the 1964presidential election substantially below the national
average.105 The Court accepted both characteristics as relevant to discrimination and
held the coverage formula rational in both practice and theory.106
Followingreview of the coverage formula, the Court evaluated Section 5with
similar deference. Though conceding preclearance may have been an uncommon
exercise of congressional power, the Court asserted that exceptional conditions
can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.107 The Court acknowl-
edged covered jurisdictions continuous evasion of prior federal efforts to expand
minority electoral participation and recognized that such jurisdictions likely would
attempt more elusion in the future.108 In light of the circumstances, the Court con-
cluded Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.109Katzenbach thereby
gave preclearance, and its coverage formula, a powerful endorsement of constitu-
tional validity, and the opinions reasoning remained the linchpin of federal courts
interpretations of the preclearance framework for decades.110
FollowingKatzenbach, the Court continued to uphold the constitutionality of
the preclearance regime. Allen v. State Board of Elections111clarified that preclearance
was not limited to state legislation concerningvoter registration and extended to
any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a
103 Id. at 326(quotingMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17U.S. (4Wheat.)316, 421(1819)).
104 Id. at 32930.
105 Id. at 330.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 334.
108 Id. at 335 (Congress knew that some of the States covered by § 4 (b) of the Act had
resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contrivingnew rules of various kinds for the sole
purpose of perpetuatingvotingdiscrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.
Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future
in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. (foot-
note omitted)).
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 28485 (1999); City of Rome v. United
States, 466 U.S. 156, 17980 (1980).
111 393U.S. 544(1969).
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minor way.112The Court thereby construed Section 5as defendingagainst attempts
to dilute the votingpower of minority groups.113
Georgia v. United States114 reiterated the Courts broad interpretation of pre-
clearances function. The Court held that preclearance was mandated for covered
states reapportionment plans,115 iteratingits explanation from Allen that Section 5
was applicable to any votingchange with the potential to dilute minority voting
strength.116 The Court discarded Georgias as-applied challenge to the constitutional-
ity of Section 5in a single sentence referencingKatzenbach: And for the reasons
stated at length in South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . . we reaffirm that the Act is a per-
missible exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.117
In City of Rome v. United States,118the Court rejected the argument that Section 5
does not prohibit votingpractices with a discriminatory effect alone, and held that a
grant of preclearance demands absence of both discriminatory effect and purpose.119
The city claimed that the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly barred only purposeful racial
discrimination in voting, so Congress could not prohibit votingpractices devoid of
discriminatory intent even if such practices produced a discriminatory effect.120
The Court conceded that even if the Fifteenth Amendment facially proscribes only
purposeful discrimination, precedent construing Congresss Fifteenth Amendment en-
forcement authority foreclosed any argument that Congress could not allow voting
modifications with only a discriminatory effect.121In support of its position, the Court
reiterated its unstinting understanding of Congresss enforcement authority under the
Civil War Amendments.122 In the Courts view, the Civil War Amendments were
specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state
sovereignty, such that they permitted Congress to intrude on state and local elec-
toral control.123 Fifteen years after the VRAs enactment, City of Rome verified the
Courts sustained acceptance of the preclearance regimes constitutionality.
Lopez v. Monterey County124 indicated the Courts complacence with preclearance
nearly three decades after its initial expiration was supposed to occur. Federalism-
based arguments against the Acts constitutionality still proved futile. [T]he Voting
112 Id. at 566.
113 Id. at 569.
114 411U.S. 526(1973).
115 Id. at 535.
116 Id. at 534.
117 Id. at 535.
118 446U.S. 156(1980).
119 Id. at 172.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 173.
122 Id. at 17478.
123 Id. at 17980.
124 525U.S. 266(1999).
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Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment
permits this intrusion . . . .125
Northwest Austin126is notable for dicta probingthe constitutionality of preclear-
ance. For the first time in over forty years, the Court appeared troubled both by pre-
clearances discrepant application among jurisdictions, and the coverage formulas
reliance on decades-old data.127A reverence for state sovereignty was evident in the
Courts language: [A] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statutes disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets.128While the Court punted on the question of
preclearances constitutionality by determining the district was eligible for bailout,129
Northwest Austin was a harbinger of the Courts attitude toward the modern consti-
tutionality of the preclearance regime.
E. Shelby County v. Holder
Shelby County, Alabama had been subject to preclearance upon the VRAs initial
enactment in 1965.130 Unlike the district in Northwest Austin, Shelby County was
ineligible for piecemeal bailout because of several VRA infractions committed in the
county duringthe precedingten years.131 Shelby Countys constitutional challenge to
the preclearance framework ensued in 2010, after the county sought a declaratory
judgment that the preclearance regime was unconstitutional.132 Shelby County espe-
cially focused its attack on the coverage formula, which it considered the most viable
avenue for disablingthe preclearance regime since annulment of the formula would
allow the Court to avoid the overarching issue of Section 5s constitutionality.133
125 Id. at 28485.
126 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193(2009).
127 Id. at 203 (The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the
jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statutes coverage formula is based on data
that is nowmore than 35years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account
for current political conditions.).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 205, 211.
130 See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 41 (Shelby County became a covered
jurisdiction not by virtue of any discriminatory conduct on its own part, but because it is located
in a fully covered state: Alabama.). Alabama was among the states covered under the 1965
Act. See supra note 44and accompanyingtext.
131 See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 42. Shelby County and its political sub-
divisions submitted 682votingchanges to the Justice Department between 1965and 2012. Of
these 682proposed changes, the Justice Department objected to five. Paul, supra note 19,
at 275.
132 Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 42.
133 Id. at 43.
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After lower courts rejected Shelby Countys challenge,134 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the Acts disparate treatment of states was
justified by current needs.135Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion with a reci-
tation of tenets enunciated in Northwest Austin: [T]he Act imposes current burdens
and must be justified by current needs such that a departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statutes disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.136Justice Roberts re-
iterated the pertinence of the principle of equal sovereignty throughout the opinion.137
To a majority of the Court, the VRA offended this principle by compellingcertain
states to gain federal approval for internal legislation otherwise within their sovereign
authority.138 The Court stressed the comparative inequity of preclearance, noting
covered jurisdictions needed federal approval for laws that noncovered jurisdictions
could pass without beseechingfederal approval.139
Addressing the coverage formulas constitutionality, the Court noted that upon
the VRAs initial enactment in 1965, the reverse-engineered formula was rational
in both practice and theory.140 The Court, though, disapproved of the formulas
modern reliance on outdated data in consideration of the monumental improvements
in minority electoral participation witnessed since the 1960s.141 Congress if it is
to divide the States must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions.142 The Court rejected the governments
contention that the coverage formula remained valid since it deterred covered juris-
dictions from implementingsecond-generation barriers to minority participation:
Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting such [second-generation] efforts
simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the §4coverage formula,
which is based on voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution.143The Court
134 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679F.3d 848, 884(D.C. Cir. 2012);Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,
811F. Supp. 2d 424, 508(D.D.C. 2011).
135 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612, 2619(2013).
136 Id. at 2622(quotingNw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 203
(2009)).
137 Id. at 2623 (Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also
a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States.); id. at 2624 ([A]s we
made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly
pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.); id. at 2623 (Over a hundred
years ago, this Court explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power,
dignity and authority.); id. (Indeed, the constitutional equality of the States is essential
to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.).
138 Id. at 2624.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2627(quotingSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 330(1966)).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2629.
143 Id.
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thus stonewalled the various justifications that had enabled preclearance to survive
past challenges.
After noting Congresss failure to amend the coverage formula following North-
west Austins ominous dicta, the Court held the Section 4(b) coverage formula un-
constitutional.144 While the Court did not rule on Section 5s constitutionality,145by
strikingthe coverage formula, the Court effectively nullified preclearance as well.
Section 5s statutory configuration requires a coverage formula to demarcate its ap-
plication.146 Without a coverage formula, preclearance does not apply to any juris-
diction. Thus, Shelby County released all covered jurisdictions from preclearance.
Since the Court did not rule on Section 5s constitutionality, application of pre-
clearance can resume if Congress can draft another formula outfitted for the modern
era. In early 2014, a bipartisan group of congressional representatives introduced a
bill containinga new coverage formula for the VRA.147However, the Court cautioned
that Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks
to current conditions.148For now, the nation wades into a novel electoral situation.
Some formerly covered jurisdictions have never exercised full electoral autonomy in
an era where racial equality is the societal norm. Whether the practical elimination
of preclearance will generate a new wave of discriminatory votinglaws remains an
open question. Since Shelby County, some formerly covered states have passed laws
that likely would have failed to achieve preclearance. In Texas and North Carolina,
civil rights groups are challenging postShelby County voter ID requirements under
Section 2of the VRA.149
II. THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
A. Development of the Equal Footing Doctrine
Shelby Countys designation of the equal sovereignty principle is a misnomer.
The principle the Court purports to reference, based on its citation to Coyle v. Smith,
is better recognized throughout federal jurisprudence as the equal footingdoctrine.150
144 Id. at 2631.
145 Id.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a)of this title based upon determinations
made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title . . . . (emphasis added)).
147 Ari Berman, Members of Congress Introduce a New Fix for the Voting Rights Act, THE
NATION (Jan.16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/177962/members-congress-introduce
-new-fix-voting-rights-act#.
148 Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2631.
149 Jaime Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County, WASH.POST (July 7, 2014),
http:/www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since
-shelby-county-v-holder/.
150 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (Over a hundred years ago, this Court explained
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The equal footingdoctrine generally stipulates that a state, upon its admission to the
Union, is on equal footing with all other states and entitled to the same sovereign
powers held by existingstates.151 The doctrine protects states sovereignty by mini-
mizing Congresss ability to impose inequitable terms of admission on states through
acts conferringstatehood.152
The Constitution references neither equal footingnor equal sovereigntyof states.153
The Constitutional Congress of 1787contemplated includinga constitutional provi-
sion mandating states to be admitted on the same terms with the original states, but
the phrase was omitted from the final text.154 The equal footing phrase did appear
in early American legislation, notably the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.155The ordi-
nance stipulated that states created from territory ceded by Virginia to the federal gov-
ernment would join the Union with the same sovereign rights as existingstates.156
The Northwest Ordinance, originallypassed before the Constitution was finalized, was
reauthorized in 1789followingthe Constitutions adoption.157
In 1796, Congress used the equal footing phrase in the act admittingTennessee
to the Union. Tennessee thereby joined the United States on an equal footing with
original states in all respects whatever.158 Since Tennessees admission, the equal
that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority. (quoting
Coyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559, 567(1911))).
151 See Robert Barrett, History on an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Federal
Lands, 68U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 77071 (1997).
152 See Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications of a 1990s States Rights Battle, 32GONZ. L. REV. 417, 462 (1997) (The
reasoningbehind this doctrine is both preserving new states ability to exercise all of its
powers under the Constitution and preventingCongress from enlargingits own authority by
imposing conditions on new states sovereignty.).
153 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union;but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State;nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, with-
out the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.).
154 Valerie J. M. Brader, Congress Pet: Why the Clean Air Acts Favoritism of California
Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVTL. L.
& POLY 119, 130, 132(2007).
155 Id. at 133. Justice OConnor disclosed the equal footing doctrines common law foun-
dation in Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 19596 (1987). Under
English common law, the Kingpossessed title to all submerged lands under navigable water
as a sovereign attribute. Upon achievingindependence, the Thirteen Colonies inherited title
to submerged lands under navigable waters within their borders as part of the succession of
sovereignty from the British monarchy. Id.
156 See John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3BAYLOR L. REV. 519,
523(1951).
157 Id.
158 Southwell, supra note 152, at 461(quotingFRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 6THEFEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3414(1906)).
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footing phrase (or the equivalent same footing wording) has appeared in the text
or title of every subsequent enablingact admittinga state to the Union.159
B. Supreme Court Application of the Equal Footing Doctrine
In 1831, a Supreme Court Justice first referenced the equal footingdoctrine.160
In a concurring opinion, Justice Henry Baldwin remarked that new states were to
be admitted into the union on an equal footingwith the original states;of course, not
shorn of their powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction within the boundaries assigned
by congress to the new states.161The first majority Court opinion to acknowledge the
doctrine was Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas in 1835.162
Pollard v. Hagan163 was the equal footing doctrines first leading role, and the
decision expounded thedoctrines constitutional underpinning.164Pollard concerned
competingclaims of title to submerged land in Alabama.165The plaintiff claimed title
through a patent issued by the United States government in 1836, while the defendant
argued rightful title under a grant recognized in 1795by Georgias legislature prior to
Georgias cession of territory that would eventually form Alabama.166Rejectingthe
plaintiffs claim, the Court explained that [w]hen Alabama was admitted into the
union, on an equal footingwith the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain as held by existing states.167 Since
Georgias cession of the territory that came to form Alabama was made on the con-
dition that any state created from that land would stand on equal footingwith exist-
ingstates, Article IV, Section Three of the Constitution obliged the Court to honor
Georgias intent in granting the territory.168 Alabamas admission on an equal foot-
ingthus gave it exclusive control of its territory and precluded federal grants of its
territory.169 Permoli v. New Orleans further cemented the equal footing doctrines
159 Id.;see also Brader, supra note 154, at 13435.
160 Brader, supra note 154, at 136.
161 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30U.S. (5Pet.)1, 35(1831)(Baldwin, J., concurring).
162 Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 235 (1835) (This article obviously
contemplates two objects. One, that Louisiana shall be admitted into the union as soon as
possible, upon an equal footing with the other states . . . .).
163 44U.S. (3How.)212(1845).
164 See Brader, supra note 154, at 139n.100.
165 Id. at 139.
166 Pollard, 44U.S. at 214, 218.
167 Id. at 223.
168 Id. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (New states may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union;but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State;nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, with-
out the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.).
169 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 22829; see also Barrett, supra note 151, at 783 (The linchpin of
anti-federal arguments is Pollard v. Hagan . . . .); Hanna, supra note 156, at 531 (The
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protection of state sovereignty.170Permoli held Louisianas admission to the Union on
an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever, entitled it to sover-
eign control over subjects not expressly regulated by federal lawor the Constitution.171
After Pollard and Permoli, the Court intermittently utilized the equal footingdoc-
trine for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The doctrine mostly was associated
with title disputes between states and the federal government,172though it was pressed
into newfound situations too. The infamous Dred Scott decision, for instance, refer-
enced the doctrine in a discussion about the comparative rights of states.173
Another nineteenth century case featuring the doctrine likewise reflected the eras
underlyingracial inequity. Ward v. Race Horse involved a Native American prose-
cuted for violatinga Wyominghuntingstatute.174 Prior to Wyomings admission to
the Union, Race Horses tribe had formed a treaty with the federal government allow-
ing for broad hunting privileges over federal land in exchange for the tribes agree-
ment to settle on a reservation.175 Upon achieving statehood, Wyomings legislature
imposed hunting regulations in contravention to privileges in the tribes treaty.176 In
upholdingRace Horses prosecution, the Court reasoned that Wyomingacquired con-
trol over all its territory upon achievingstatehood, and the state was within its sover-
eign rights to impose huntingregulations irrespective of the treaty.177To recognize
otherwise, the Court asserted, would deny Wyomingadmission on an equal footing.178
theory of the Court [in Pollard]was that the eminent domain, as an element of sovereignty,
belonged exclusively to the states.).
170 44U.S. (3How.)589, 607(1845).
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., id. at 609;Shively v. Bowlby, 152U.S. 1, 7, 27, 34(1894);Sands v.
Manistee River Improvement Co., 123U.S. 288, 296(1887);Van Brocklin v. Tennessee,
117 U.S. 151, 16768 (1886); Escanaba & Lake Michigan Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S.
678, 68889 (1883).
173 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 461 (1856) (Has the law of Illinois
any greater force within the jurisdiction of Missouri, than the laws of the latter within that
of the former?Certainly not. They stand upon an equal footing. Neither has any force extra-
territorially, except what may be voluntarily conceded to them.); see also James Blacksher
& Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional
Right to Vote: Shelby County v. Holder, 8HARV. L. & POLY REV. 39(2014).
174 163U.S. 504, 507(1896).
175 Id. at 50809.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 51416.
178 The enablingact declares that the State of Wyomingis admitted on equal
terms with the other States, and this declaration, which is simply an
expression of the general rule, which presupposes that States, when ad-
mitted into the Union, are endowed with powers and attributes equal in
scope to those enjoyed by the States already admitted, repels any pre-
sumption that in this particular case Congress intended to admit the
State of Wyomingwith diminished governmental authority.
Id. at 51415.
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The early twentieth century witnessed several significant decisions in the equal
footingcanon. Stearns v. Minnesota179demarcated a split in the equal footingdoc-
trines protection of political and territorial sovereignty.180 Stearns held Congress
could impose limitations on states territorial sovereignty through enabling acts,
since a mere agreement in reference to property involves no question of equality
of status.181But Stearns stipulated the equal footing doctrine may forbid any agree-
ment or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations.182
Nearly a decade later, the Court showcased the equal footing doctrines staunch
protection of political sovereignty. Coyle v. Smith posited a challenge to Oklahomas
legislative reassignment of the states capital city from Guthrie to Oklahoma City.183
Oklahomas enabling act had mandated Guthrie was to serve as the state capitol until
1913, after which the states citizens would choose the capital city by popular vote.184
But the state legislature moved the capital on its own initiative in 1910.185 Coyles
principal issue concerned the validity of this legislative transplantation made in con-
travention to an enablingact restriction.186 The Court sided with Oklahoma, as [t]he
power to locate its own seat of government . . . is essentially and peculiarly [a]state
power[].187In potent language, Coyle provided the most loquacious articulation of
the equal footing doctrines purport to date:
This Union was and is a union of States, equal in power, dig-
nity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sov-
ereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
itself. To maintain otherwise would be to say that the Union,
through the power of Congress to admit new States, might come
to be a union of States unequal in power, as includingStates whose
powers were restricted only by the Constitution, with others whose
powers had been further restricted by an act of Congress accepted
as a condition of admission. Thus it would result, first, that the
powers of Congress would not be defined by the Constitution
alone, but in respect to new states, enlarged or restricted by the
conditions imposed upon new states by its own legislation admit-
tingthem into the Union;and, second, that such new States might
179 179U.S. 223(1900).
180 See Brader, supra note 154, at 142.
181 Stearns, 179U.S. at 245.
182 Id.
183 221U.S. 559, 563(1911).
184 Id. at 564.
185 Id. at 562.
186 Id. at 563.
187 Id. at 565.
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not exercise all of the powers which had not been delegated by
the Constitution, but only such as had not been further bargained
away as conditions of admission.188
The Court mustered the equal footingdoctrine to resolve a groupingof mid-
twentieth century title disputes between states and the federal government. United
States v. Texas189was a showdown over offshore resources in the Gulf of Mexico.190
The Court held resources beyond the low-water mark involve national interests and
national responsibilities,191and enjoined Texas from harvestingresources outside
its inland water.192 The decision atypically applied the doctrine as a limitation on
state, rather than federal, power. The equal footing clause prevents extension of
the sovereignty of a State into a domain of political and sovereign power of the
United States from which the other States have been excluded, just as it prevents a
contraction of sovereignty which would produce inequality among the States.193
United States v. Louisiana194similarly involved a disagreement between the federal
government and states over Gulf resources.195The Court rejected the argument that
the equal footingdoctrine compelled extension of equal seaward boundaries for all
Gulf states.196In the tradition of Stearns, property rights as an attribute of sovereignty
did not warrant the equal footing doctrines unconditional protection.197
In the second half of the twentieth century, plaintiffs deployed equal footing
arguments in a host of backdrops, both familiar and novel. Disputes over title to land
remained a common settingfor the doctrine.198But the doctrine was summoned in
less conventional domains too, includingchallenges to congressional designation
of a nuclear depository199and a polygamy prohibition.200
188 Id. at 567. Justice Roberts quoted much of this paragraph from Coyle in explicatingthe
equal sovereignty principle in Shelby County. See supra note 137.
189 339U.S. 707(1950).
190 Id. at 709.
191 Id. at 719.
192 Id. at 720.
193 Id. at 71920 (citations omitted).
194 363U.S. 1(1960).
195 Id. at 45.
196 Id. at 7677.
197 See supra notes 17982 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482U.S. 193(1987).
199 Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990) ([T]he equal footing doctrine
is not a restriction on Congress power to enact regulations concerning the siting of a national
nuclear waste repository pursuant to the Property Clause.).
200 Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 106768 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding plaintiffs
claim that the provision of Utahs enabling act forbiddingpolygamy violated equal footing
doctrine lacked merit because state had power to subsequently legalize polygamy upon achiev-
ingstatehood).
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The equal footingdoctrine was largely foreign to election litigation through the
twentieth century.201 Katzenbach notably rejected application of the equal footing
doctrine to Voting Rights Act litigation to the effect that the doctrines applicability
in that context seemed foreclosed.202In Katzenbach, the Court succinctly dismissed
South Carolinas equal footing challenge to the preclearance regime, explaining
The doctrine of the equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon which
States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have
subsequently appeared.203
Not until Northwest Austin,204over forty years after Katzenbach, did the Court
assign any constitutional heft to the equal footingdoctrine in the context of VRA
litigation. Northwest Austin cited equal footingprecedent in dicta questioningthe
coverage formulas constitutionality.205 [A] departure from the fundamental prin-
ciple of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statutes disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.206 Though referringto
equal sovereignty, Northwest Austin supported its assertions with citations to the equal
footingcases of United States v. Louisiana207 and Texas v. White.208 Those cases,
though, pertained to circumstances relatingto enablingacts.209 Northwest Austin
strategically cited language from Katzenbach, reiterating that, The doctrine of the
equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subse-
quently appeared.210 Omitted was language qualifying the equal footing doctrines
applicability to the context of state admissions.211
201 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 32829 (1966).
202 Id.
203 Id. (citingCoyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559(1911)).
204 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193(2009).
205 Id. at 203.
206 Id.
207 363U.S. 1(1960). See supra notes 19497and accompanying text.
208 74U.S. (7Wall.)700(1869). Texas v. White loosely pertained to the equal footing
doctrine. The case concerned the validity of a sale of U.S. bonds by the Texan confederate
government. The opinion discussed the nature of the Union, but does not explicitly reference
the equal footingof states. See id. at 725.
209 See 363U.S. at 66. United States v. Louisiana is somewhat comparable to Northwest
Austin in that Louisiana objected to differential treatment amongstates, specifically the more
extensive seaward boundaries afforded to Texas and Florida. Id. at 7677. The case diverges
from Northwest Austin, though, in that the extended boundaries of Texas and Florida were
granted as part of their terms of admission into the United States. Id. Subjugation to pre-
clearance assuredly was not a term of Texass admission to the Union.
210 Nw. Austin, 557U.S. at 203(quotingSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301,
32829 (1966)) (alterations in original).
211 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 32829 (1966) (The doctrine of the
equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine ap-
plies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.).
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C. Shelby County and its Equal Sovereignty Principle
In Shelby County,212the Court sunk in the dagger so thinly veiled in Northwest
Austins dicta. ShelbyCounty lionized the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
as though it was constitutional text.213While there is some appeal to an idea of equal
sovereignty amongstates, particularly from a federalist perspective, the equal footing
doctrine does not posit a principle of equal sovereignty outside the context of states
terms of admission, and even that tenet is qualified.214
In her Shelby County dissent, Justice Ginsburg lambasted the Courts utilization
of the equal footingdoctrine.215 Justice Ginsburgpointed to multiple instances of
congressional legislation differentiating amongst states outside the context of states
admittance.216Justice Ginsburgfurther accentuated that Katzenbach had explicitly
rebuffed the doctrines applicability as a challenge to the coverage formula, question-
inghow the majority could postulate such a glaringinconsistency to justify overruling
a congressional act:
If the Court is suggestingthat dictum in Northwest Austin silently
overruled Katzenbachs limitation of the equal sovereignty doc-
trine to the admission of new States, the suggestion is untena-
ble. Northwest Austin cited Katzenbachs holding in the course
of declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or
even what standard of review applied to the question. In todays
decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in Northwest
Austin, attributingbreadth to the equal sovereignty principle in
flat contradiction of Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an
explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any dis-
cussion of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels adherence
to Katzenbachs ruling on the limited significance of the equal
sovereignty principle.217
Justice Roberts fleetingly acknowledged Shelby Countys irregularity with prece-
dent. He mentioned Coyle involved a matter of state admission, and ceded Katzenbach
had declined to extend the equal footingdoctrine outside the realm of state admis-
sions.218But Roberts, as Ginsburgnoted, largely sidestepped the issue by reachingto
Northwest Austins dicta.219 [A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental
212 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612(2013).
213 Id. at 2622(quotingNw. Austin, 557U.S. at 203).
214 Stearnsv.Minnesota, 179U.S. 223, 245(1900)(stipulatingthat the equal footingdoctrine
may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations).
215 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 264849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 2649(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
218 Id. at 262324.
219 Id. at 2624.
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principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessingsubsequent dis-
parate treatment of States.220
The Chief Justice is simply wrong here. Congress cannot abridge states com-
parative political equality through restrictions imposed in enablingacts, but there
is not a recognized constitutional doctrine prohibitingCongress from differentiating
amongst the states through legislation after their admission to the Union. Such dif-
ferentiation is relatively common.221 But Shelby County not only insisted an equal
sovereignty principle exists, the decision utilized this chimerical canon to annul a
legislative regime that had effectively enfranchised millions of Americans and de-
bilitated the institutionalized plague of racial discrimination in voting.
III. A PROSPECTIVE EXPLANATION FOR SHELBY COUNTYS
RELIANCE ON THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
As discussed, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty222 is not a rec-
ognized doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence.223The equal footing doctrine is a principle
inhibitingcongressional debasement of state sovereignty through conditions in en-
ablingacts,224but the doctrine lacks the gravitas attributed to it in Shelby County.225
Shelby Countys equal sovereignty principle thus is a doctrinal bastardization at best,
afforded precedential support only through omission and tactful editing.
The unavoidable question beseeched by Shelby County is why the Court chose
the equal footing doctrine to strike down the VRAs coverage formula? An amalgam-
ation of three factors proffers a prospective explanation. First, precedent constricted
the Courts ability to annul the VRAs coverage formula using more conventional
constitutional tenets. Second, the equal footingdoctrine supplied a flexible axiom
for the Court to fashion into ostensive justification for its holding. Finally, the equal
footingdoctrine served as a façade for an ideological philosophy advocatingthe dig-
nity of states as political sovereigns.
A. Precedential Restriction of the Courts Ability to Annul the Coverage Formula
Precedent upholding preclearances framework likely necessitated the Courts
embrace of a doctrine largely remote to VRA litigation in order to defeat the coverage
220 Id.
221 See supra note 216and accompanyingtext.
222 Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2623.
223 See supra Part II.C.
224 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) ([W]hen a new State is admitted into
the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain
to the original States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired
or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which
the new State came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of
congressional legislation after admission.).
225 See Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2623.
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formula. The equal footingdoctrine offered a relatively untarnished doctrinal vantage
from which the Court could attack the disfavored coverage formula.
Beginningwith Katzenbach, the Court assumed a highly deferential posture
toward Congresss authority to implement and reauthorize the VRA.226 Any argu-
ment that states retained sovereign primacy over electoral affairs under the Tenth
Amendment227was summarily repudiated.228 As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohi-
bition of racial discrimination in voting.229 From the VRAs inception, the Court
evaluated challenges to the preclearance regime with a rational basis standard that
foreclosed constitutional challenges based on the Tenth Amendment.230
For four decades after Katzenbach, the Court consistently guarded the VRA
with robust language dismissive of federalism concerns inherent in the Acts struc-
ture. City of Rome indicated the Courts deference to Congress had not waned with
time.231 In City of Rome, federalisms principles were necessarily overridden by
[Congresss] power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by appropriate legisla-
tion.232 Through the 1990s, the Court remained unquestioning of the VRAs in-
trusion onto state sovereignty.233
Northwest Austin indicated a shiftingattitude on the Court, though. Principles of
federalism materialized as a counter to preclearances intrusiveness.234But precedent
effectively insulated the preclearance regime from constitutional assailment under
traditional strains of federalist argument. If the Court was to strike preclearance or
its coverage formula, it would need to do so on grounds not conclusively refuted by
226 See Paul, supra note 19, at 278.
227 See Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) (Each State has the power to pre-
scribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen, and the
title to offices shall be tried, whether in the judicial courts or otherwise.).
228 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (The gist of the matter is that
the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. When a State exer-
cises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial
review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for
circumventing a federally protected right. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
347(1960))).
229 Id. at 324.
230 See Paul, supra note 19, at 278.
231 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (Congress considered
determination that at least another 7years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter
the perpetuation of 95years of pervasive votingdiscrimination is both unsurprisingand
unassailable. The extension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment.).
232 Id. at 179.
233 See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 284 (1999) (In short, the Voting Rights
Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty.).
234 Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 202(2009)(discussingfed-
eralism costs instituted by the VRA).
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precedent. The equal footingdoctrine, cloaked as the principle of equal sovereignty,
afforded a moderately intact avenue for the Court to debase the preclearance regime
without gratingforty years of precedent.
Katzenbach undeniably rejected an equal footingargument in the context of pre-
clearance litigation.235But after Katzenbachs succinct dismissal, the equal footing
doctrine laid dormant in the realm of preclearance litigation. Challengers to preclear-
ance likely considered the doctrine a fruitless avenue for underminingpreclearance
on account of Katzenbachs terse dismissal. Or perhaps challengers were cognizant of
the doctrines appropriate context. Regardless, the doctrine proved decisive in Shelby
County as precedential backingfor the equal sovereignty principle. The Court likely
assigned constitutional gravitas to the equal footingdoctrine partlybecause the doctrine
had a diminutive history in VRA litigation. Unlike other federalist-strain arguments,236
the Court had not repetitively rejected the doctrine as a constraint on the preclearance
regimes constitutionality. A single sentence from Katzenbach was the only precedent
explicitly denying the equal footing doctrines suitability in preclearance litigation.237
Thus, the doctrine likely enticed the Court in its pursuit of doctrinal justification under-
miningthe preclearance regime.
In sum, it is likely that Shelby County roused the equal footingdoctrine because
it was one of the few channels of argument not resoundingly foreclosed by precedent.
So longas the Court ignored context and brushed aside a sentence of precedent, the
doctrine furnished a facial restriction on Congresss capacity to impose disparate obli-
gations on states.
B. The Equal Footing Doctrines Flexibility
The equal footing doctrines pliability may further explain Shelby Countys
reliance on it. The doctrine has touched a comprehensive range of subject matter,
includingissues of title;238 ownership of bonds;239 corporate taxbreaks;240 a treaty
235 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 32829 (1966).
236 See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283 ([W]e have specifically upheld the constitutionality of § 5
of the Act against a challenge that this provision usurps powers reserved to the States.); City
of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179 ([P]rinciples of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments by appropriate legislation. Those Amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.); Katzenbach, 383U.S.
at 325 (The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions
of state power.).
237 See supra note 203and accompanyingtext.
238 See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 2223 (1960); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 71321 (1950); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 22324 (1845).
239 See Texas v. White, 74U.S. (7Wall.)700(1869). Texas v. White loosely pertained to
the equal footingdoctrine. See supra note 208.
240 See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 24344 (1900).
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with Native Americans;241 transplantation of a state capitol;242 even slavery.243
Stearns244further gave the territorial aspect of sovereignty protected by the doctrine
less fortitude than its political counterpart.245 Thus, even within its proper context,
the equal footingdoctrine has stood for different ideals, such that its true import is
somewhat obscured.
Though the factual backdrop to the equal footing doctrines application has
varied over time, until Northwest Austin and Shelby County, the doctrines function
always pertained in some degree to states terms of admission. But if this lone con-
stancy in application is bypassed, the equal footingdoctrine ostensibly presents a
general restraint on Congresss ability to impose dissimilar obligations on states.
Shelby County seems to have cherry-picked the doctrines functional restriction on
Congress, while disregarding the doctrines crucial contextual relation to matters
pertainingto state admissions.
Shelby Countys strategically worded quotation from Coyle lends credence to
the proposition of selective interpretation. Over a hundred years ago, this Court
explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority.246The subsequent sentence in Coyle, tactfully omitted by Chief Justice
Roberts, qualified the precedingassertion of state equality to the context of state
admissions.247 Examination of Shelby Countys citations thereby buttresses the in-
sinuation that the Court customized the relatively pliable equal footingdoctrine into
a vehicle for its equal sovereignty principle.
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine as a Mask for a State Sovereignty Doctrine
A final consideration relevant to Shelby Countys use of the equal footing doc-
trine implicates the ideology of some members of the Court. While Shelby County
cited equal footingprecedent, the Court may have created a new constitutional doc-
trine entirely. Among some conservative scholars, the ideal of the states dignity as
241 See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 51014 (1896).
242 See Coyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559(1911).
243 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60U.S. (19How.)393, 461(1856).
244 179U.S. 223(1900).
245 See id. at 245;supra note 214and accompanyingtext.
246 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612, 2623(2013)(quotingCoyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559, 567(1911)).
247 Coyles next sentence qualifies the previous assertion:
To maintain otherwise would be to say that the Union, through the power
of Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of States
unequal in power, as includingStates whose powers were restricted
only by the Constitution, with others whose powers had been further
restricted by an act of Congress accepted as a condition of admission.
Coyle, 221U.S. at 567.
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sovereigns is esteemed as a lost tenet in the structure of American government.248
As Joseph Fishkin details in The Dignity of the South, the theory of state dignity
fundamentally demands respect for states as sovereign entities distinct from the col-
lective Union.249The theory is not substantiated by constitutional text, but purportedly
engrained in the American system of dual sovereignty.250
In accordance with the theory of state dignity, preclearance violated states dignity
through the federal governments seizure of a traditional aspect of state sovereignty:
the power to regulate elections.251Some proponents of state dignity contend that since
the end of the Civil War, the federal government has steadily usurped sovereign power
from the South. These state dignity theorists thus consider Congresss continued
subjugation of Southern states to rigorous federal oversight as debasing those states
dignity as sovereigns.252
William Rehnquist is regarded as the Courts modern foreman of state dignity.253
The Rehnquist Revolution of the 1990s began to stanchion the concept of state
dignity, as Court decisions from this period often departed from the twentieth century
trend of judicial deference to Congress.254 Rehnquists Court refuted the constitutional-
ity of federal legislation rangingfrom gun regulations255to civil remedies for victims
of gender-related crimes.256 Rhetoric from these decisions evinced the Courts high
regard for state dignity257: The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to
accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.258
Rehnquists death in 2005did not extinguish thestatedignityrenaissance. Contem-
porary decisions continue to reference the dignity of states, directly or tangentially, in
discussions on state sovereignty and the proper scope of congressional power.259
248 Columbia University historian William Dunningwas a prominent proponent of the
sovereign dignity of states around the turn of the 19th century. Dunningproliferated a contorted
account of the Civil War and its aftermath that characterized the Civil War and Reconstruction
as a campaign of federal oppression that had resulted in a flagrant appropriation of states
constitutional powers. Dunnings writings were distributed in American schools during the
formative years of some members of the current Supreme Court and may have influenced
their perceptions of sovereignty. See Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123YALEL.J.
ONLINE 175, 18386 (2013).
249 See id. at 176.
250 See id. at 176, 187.
251 See id. at 17677.
252 See id. at 178.
253 See id. at 186.
254 See id.
255 United States v. Lopez, 514U.S. 549, 567(1995).
256 United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598, 627(2000).
257 See, e.g., Printzv. United States, 521U.S. 898, 935(1997).
258 Fed. Mar. Commn v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
259 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132S. Ct. 2492, 2522(2012)(Scalia, J. dissenting)
(opiningthat if Arizona did not have sovereign authority to regulate state citizenship then the
Court should cease referring to it as a sovereign State).
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Justice Roberts, who once clerked for Rehnquist, penned the majority opinions in
both Northwest Austin and Shelby County. Both decisions stand as victories for state
dignity, and the principle is rhetorically embedded in both opinions.260
Though Shelby County conflated state dignity with the equal footingdoctrine, the
Court intentionally may have fused the concepts to supply precedential validation for
a broader conviction about the proper interplay between state and federal govern-
ments. Since state dignity is not a recognized constitutional doctrine, the Court likely
needed some precedential sustenance to back its convictions. The equal footingdoc-
trine furnished a relatively obscure doctrinal avenue that the Court could fashion into
a modern tenet requiringCongress to respect the sovereign domain of states. Citation
to equal footingprecedent thus only served as a precedential foundation. The Courts
choice to phrase the doctrine as the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
among the States,261instead of usingequal footinglanguage, strengthens the suppo-
sition that the Court is referencinga separate concept altogether.
If the Court has in fact created a new doctrine of state dignity, the enduringimpli-
cations could prove momentous. Congress certainly will have to consider a discrepant
impact on states in the conception of another VRA coverage formula;Shelby County
said as much.262 But the repercussions of such a doctrine may extend beyond the
confines of preclearance litigation. No qualifyinglanguage tempered Shelby Countys
declaration that the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly per-
tinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.263It is not implausible
to construe that phrasingto mean any congressional legislation differentiatingamong
states must respect the principle of states sovereign dignity.
A state dignity doctrine could posit an obstacle to any congressional attempts
to implement legislation with variant impact on states. On the other hand, the Court
simply may have twisted precedent to annul an obsolete coverage formula it consid-
ered unfair in its modern application. After all, the Court did preserve the constitu-
tionality of Section 5, which itself offends the concept of state dignity. Nonetheless,
Shelby Countys most meaningful consequence could be the origination of a constraint
on congressional authority based on the concept of states dignity as sovereigns.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court misapplied the equal footingdoctrine as justification for
striking the Voting Rights Acts coverage formula. Shelby County displaced the equal
260 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2012) (Over a hundred years ago, this
Court explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911))); id. (This allocation of
powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the
States. (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011))).
261 Id. at 2623.
262 Id. at 2624.
263 Id.
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footing doctrine from its proper context in order to provide a doctrinal limitation on
Congresss capacity to enact legislation with discrepant impact on states. It is highly
improbable that the Shelby County majority, composed of some of the nations preemi-
nent constitutional scholars, was heedless to the decisions irregularity with precedent.
There is indication the Court may have fashioned the equal footing doctrine into
an entirely new mechanism cabining Congresss power to enact legislation incongru-
ently impacting states. Regardless of whether the Court was correct to invalidate the
VRAs coverage formula, it is disconcerting to know that the nations highest judicial
body largely invented a judicial doctrine to annul federal legislation it considered
outdated and inequitable.
Whether Shelby Countys equal sovereignty principle will persist as a doctrinal
constraint on Congress is uncertain. More definitive is the effective end of preclearance
as a mechanism for protecting minority voting rights, and Shelby County has delivered
many states a level of electoral autonomy last seen in the days of Jim Crow.
